true discourse

For, even with the sixth century Greek poets, true discourse—in the meaningful sense—inspiring respect and terror, to which all were obliged to submit, because it held sway over all and was pronounced by men who spoke as of right, according to ritual, meted out justice and attributed to each his rightful share; it prophesied the future, not merely by announcing what was going to occur, but contributing to the actual event, carrying men along with it and thus weaving itself into the fabric of fate.

And yet, a century later, the highest truth no longer resided in what discourse was, nor in what it did; it lay in what it said.

The day dawned when truth moved over from the ritualized act—potent and just—of enunciation to settle on what was enunciated itself: its meaning, its form, its object and its relation to what it referred to. A division emerged between Hesiod and Plato, separating true discourse from false; it was a new division for, henceforth, true discourse was no longer considered precious and desirable, since it ceased to be discourse linked to the exercise of power.

. . .

True discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power is incapable of recognizing the will to truth which pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed upon us for so long, is such that the truth that it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it.

Thus, only one truth appears before our eyes: wealth, fertility and sweet strength in all its insidious universality.

Michel Foucault, “The Discourse on Language”