Resemblance
Foucault’s indictment of resemblance is based in an assumed (though carefully historically constituted) progression of the role of language. Language in the classical period, according to Foucault, was centered on naming—the proliferation of words used to resemble things:
The art of language was a way of “making a sign”—of simultaneously signifying something and arranging signs around that thing; an art of naming, therefore, and then by means of a reduplication both demonstrative and decorative, of capturing that name and enclosing it and concealing it, of designating it in turn by names that were the deferred presence of the first name, its secondary sign, its figuration, its rhetorical panoply. (O.T. 43)
This process provoked the growth of commentary to expand the complex interplay of naming. Foucault’s relatively cryptic comments on classical painting and image making presuppose an analogous process of the proliferation of resemblance outside linguistic convention:
Separation between linguistic signs and plastic elements; equivalence of resemblance and affirmation. These two principles constituted the tension in classical painting, because the second reintroduced discourse (affirmation exists only where there is speech) into an art from which the linguistic element was rigorously excluded. Hence the fact that classical painting spoke—and spoke constantly—while constituting itself completely outside language; hence the fact that it rested silently in a discursive space; hence the fact that it provided, beneath itself, a kind of common ground where it could restore the bonds of sign and image. (This is Not a Pipe 53)