Maximal Desire
There was a thought I wanted to finish, or more precisely, expand, regarding aphorisms. But I was interrupted by seeing my name in rather large type on someone else’s site. Frank, might I suggest that you and Mike (hoping that it is okay to refer to you in the familiar) take a moment to read Diddling Considered as One of the Exact Sciences by Edgar Allen Poe rather than continuing the project of misreading (obviously what must be happening) each other? I don’t think I’d be too far off the mark to suggest that diddling is what we are all doing here.
I find diddling to be endlessly fascinating. The universalist trend neatly lampooned by Poe suggests that there must be a science behind everything—even diddling. However, it is by diddling about that many great discoveries are made. The post that Frank felt wasn’t worth diddly rests at the core of an issue which deeply concerns me. I fail to understand at all why “marriage” would have anything to do with Foucault’s concerns, or mine, which are quite different from Foucault’s.
Foucault explores the social and epistemological function of sex, with an implicit critique of any purely material (Marxist) or psychological (Lacanian) approach. Critique does not imply dismissal, but rather a complication of standard methodology. My interest is different—I am less interested in the relationship between knowledge and power than I am in questions of desire—not questions of alliance, not social construction of gender—but rather questions of value. Not value in the economic or socially constructed sense (i.e. Bourdieu’s cultural capital) but the sense of a predilection towards certain patterns of desire which are not adequately addressed by any of the above methodologies.
Hence, I am concerned with why humans tend to desire the simple maxim rather than a more complex narrative. Occam’s Razor is not an adequate explanation for me. As far as post(whatever) theorists go, I actually prefer Roland Barthes, who writes a pretty mean aphorism, to Foucault’s intensely ordered and methodical style. Foucault’s thought resists reduction to a maxim at all costs.
Oddly enough, this also means that Foucault’s agenda is easier to comprehend than the agenda of a theorist like Baudrillard, Deleuze, or Barthes. Theorists that use maxims are often more dense and impenetrable than those who don’t, although those who don’t (like Foucault) often suffer the critique of people who haven’t read anything they have written, preferring to repeat what others have said rather than read long and dense volumes. They glean all their thoughts from the secondary literature which continually replicates confused and contradictory readings. Of course, it is’t just theorists that suffer this. The same thing is true of William Blake. Most people who trot out Blake as an exemplar of their own agenda have never read Blake.
Contemplating this paradox, and the paradox of why in the face of all evidence to the contrary, people prefer universal theories to particular theories (how does preaching commonality account for the persistance of difference?) is a continual fascination of mine. It’s a strange desire. But I have no delusions. It is also a diddle.
Your true diddler winds up all with a grin. But this nobody sees but himself. He grins when his daily work is done�when his allotted labors are accomplished�at night in his own closet, and altogether for his own private entertainment. He goes home. He locks his door. He divests himself of his clothes. He puts out his candle. He gets into bed. He places his head upon the pillow. All this done, and your diddler grins. This is no hypothesis. It is a matter of course. I reason a priori, and a diddle would be no diddle without a grin.
Edgar Allen Poe