Synthesis is concerned about dualism.
That charge isn’t an easy one to answer. Some things just can’t be explained any other way. For example, I was reading an article by Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede called “On Distinctions Between Classical and Modern Rhetoric” today. It offers the thesis that in the classical world, the perception of what constitutes necessary or universal truth, or episteme, was fixed and thus, there was a truth that was independent of what we say about it. The function of the rhetor was to convey truth. However, for modern rhetoric:
Connections among thought, language, and reality are thought to be grounded not in an independent, charitable reality but in the nature of the knower instead, and reality is not so much discovered or discoverable but instead constituted by the interplay of thought and language.
So, the next time you burn yourself, or stub your toe, you can tell yourself that it didn’t really happen. You just constituted your reaction based on what you thought would happen. When you close your eyes, the world actually disappears, and all that rubbish. Like it or not, we’ve got to deal with this dualism. There is what we think, and then there is a world that is. Maybe we can’t know it— and negative capability is what we need to get by. But that doesn’t mean it’s not there.
Okay, so if reality is constituted by thought and language, then it is also contingent on our point of view. “A fool sees not the same tree that a wise man sees,” to quote William Blake. It seems not a difficult leap to see that the representation, in pictures or language, of reality is by its very nature iconic, or an idealized view. However, given what we know about the fallacies of the universal, that makes these icons also phantasms, eidolons constructed from moment to moment based on “the interplay of thought and language.” There is really nothing dualistic about something being at once ideal and imaginary; it only becomes Platonic when the real is considered to be imaginary, and the ideal a separate knowable thing.
That’s why Plato expelled poets from his republic. Because they created a competition for the real, by creating imaginary ideals. The concept of eidolons is not Platonic in the slightest. We’re constantly told that truth is an unknowable thing in the postmodern world, that it is constituted from moment to moment through the processes of history. Truth is relative. Ultimately, if this is the case, then philosophy is useless.
The schism between Rhetoric and Philosophy is this: Philosophy deals with absolutes. Rhetoric deals with possibilities. In the grandest sense, postmodern philosophy is not really philosophy but rhetoric. Clear as mud?
How about this, from Michael Polynyi (cited by Lunsford and Ede)
We must inevitably see the universe from a center lying within ourselves and speak about it in terms of a human language shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse. Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our pictures of the world must lead to absurdity.
This is what language based philosophy, or rhetoric for that matter, are all about. People see some things as ideals, as icons. Icons are always flawed, and phantasmagoric precisely because they aren’t real— they are constituted by consciousness. It’s not a duality. It’s our constitution of reality. Rhetoric wants to understand and shape these icons to its own end. Philosophy wants to take icons apart and see how they work.